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LOWERING THE BAR BEHIND BARS:  
CHAO v. BALLISTA AND PRISON OFFICIAL 
LIABILITY IN ALL-FEMALE PRISONS 
Eliza Murray* 
Abstract: On March 25, 2011, in Chao v. Ballista, the U.S. District Court for 
the District of Massachusetts denied defendant prison officials’ motion for 
summary judgment on an inmate’s Eighth Amendment claims of sexual 
misconduct, and a jury held a prison superintendent liable for failure to 
protect the inmate from a prison guard’s sexual abuse. Although the dis-
trict court drew thoughtful attention to the unique vulnerabilities of fe-
male inmates, the court implicitly expanded the Supreme Court’s Farmer v. 
Brennan standard for deliberate indifference in failure to protect claims, 
potentially lowering the bar for establishing Eighth Amendment violations 
by prison officials in all-female facilities. 
Introduction 
 Former inmate Christina Chao brought a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action 
against prison guard Moises Ballista and four prison officials at South 
Middlesex Correctional Center (SMCC) for damages arising from al-
leged sexual misconduct.1 Chao claimed that Ballista sexually abused 
her while she was an inmate, thereby violating her Eighth Amendment 
right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment.2 Chao also 
claimed that the prison officials, including SMCC Superintendent Kelly 
Ryan, violated the Eighth Amendment and § 1983 by failing to protect 
her from Ballista’s abuse.3 Chao alleged that prison officials failed to 
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1 Chao v. Ballista (Chao I ), 772 F. Supp. 2d 337, 341 (D. Mass. 2011). The other defen-
dants were prison supervisory officials Kathleen Dennehy, Commissioner of the Massachu-
setts Department of Correction; Kelly Ryan, Superintendent of SMCC; Randy Azzato, Di-
rector of Security of SMCC; and Chris Tortora, Training Officer of SMCC. Id. at 341–42. 
2 See id. at 341. Chao also claimed that Ballista violated her state civil rights under the 
Massachusetts Civil Rights Act (MCRA). Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 12, § 11H–I (2010); Chao I, 
772 F. Supp. 2d at 341, 359. 
3 Chao I, 772 F. Supp. 2d at 341. Chao also claimed that the supervisory officials vio-
lated the MCRA by interfering with her civil rights to bodily integrity and to be free from 
sexual abuse. Id. at 341, 359; see § 11H–I. To establish a claim under the MCRA, Chao 
needed to show that the defendants interfered or attempted to interfere with her exercise 
or enjoyment of rights secured by the U.S. Constitution or the laws of Massachusetts by 
23 
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adequately train their officers, investigate rumors of abuse, and ensure 
safe prison conditions.4 
 The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts 
denied Ballista’s and Superintendent Ryan’s motions for summary 
judgment because there remained genuine issues of material fact.5 At 
trial, a jury found that Ballista’s conduct was “intentional, willful, wan-
ton or malicious,” and violative of the Eighth Amendment.6 Although 
Superintendent Ryan’s “conduct was not intentional, willful, wanton or 
malicious,” a jury found that she violated Chao’s Eighth Amendment 
right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment by failing to pro-
tect her from Ballista.7 Both Ballista and Superintendent Ryan moved 
for either a judgment notwithstanding the verdict or a new trial, argu-
ing that the evidence against them was insufficient.8 The district court 
denied those motions.9 
 In denying both the defendants’ summary judgment and post-trial 
motions, the court applied the standard for deliberate indifference in 
failure to protect claims set forth by the Supreme Court in Farmer v. 
Brennan.10 In its application, however, the district court implicitly ex-
panded the limits of the Farmer standard to suggest a presumption of 
constitutional-level harm in all-female prisons.11 Although the court 
drew thoughtful attention to the unique vulnerabilities of the female 
inmates, such a presumption may lower the bar for establishing Eighth 
Amendment violations by prison officials in all-female facilities.12 
                                                                                                                      
threats, intimidation, or coercion. See § 11H–I; Chao I, 772 F. Supp. 2d at 359. The court 
granted summary judgment on the MCRA claims in favor of the supervisory officials, but 
denied summary judgment for Ballista. Chao I, 772 F. Supp. 2d at 360. 
4 See Chao I, 772 F. Supp. 2d at 342. 
5 Id. at 343, 350–51 (reasoning that “[t]here is enough about the prison environ-
ment—and this case in particular—that requires a trial”). The claims against prison official 
defendants Azzato and Tortora were dismissed at summary judgment and trial, respec-
tively, and a jury found that defendant Dennehy did not violate Chao’s Eighth Amend-
ment rights. Chao v. Ballista (Chao II ), 806 F. Supp. 2d 358, 363, 379 (D. Mass. 2011); Chao 
I, 772 F. Supp. 2d at 362. 
6 Chao II, 806 F. Supp. 2d at 363. 
7 Id. The other supervisory officials were not found liable for failure to protect Chao. 
Id. 
8 Id. 
9 Id. at 383. 
10 Id.; Chao I, 772 F. Supp. 2d at 347, 351–55; see Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 836–
39 (1994). 
11 See Chao I, 772 F. Supp. 2d at 351, 353 (introducing evidence into the Farmer stan-
dard for failure to protect beyond conditions specific to SMCC or Chao). 
12 See Chao II, 806 F. Supp. 2d at 371; Chao I, 772 F. Supp. 2d at 343, 351, 353. 
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I. Chao’s Failure to Protect Claim and the Introduction of the 
Farmer Standard 
 At the time of Chao’s incarceration, SMCC had recently transi-
tioned from an all-male to an all-female facility, and accommodating 
that change was not entirely successful.13 As a minimum security prison, 
SMCC was more “akin to a college dormitory” than a traditional 
prison.14 There had been few staffing changes when SMCC transi-
tioned to an all-female population, resulting in male officers being 
posted directly outside the unlocked rooms of female inmates.15 There 
were also many areas of the prison facility where sex could go unde-
tected, as there were few surveillance cameras on the premises.16 
                                                                                                                     
 Chao and Ballista had “fifty to one hundred sexual encounters” in 
the minimum security facility.17 Chao developed romantic feelings for 
Ballista, and at one point she asked to be placed in a special program to 
be nearer to him.18 Ballista flirted with Chao and provided her with 
benefits, such as giving her advance warning when her room would be 
searched for contraband and allowing her to use his cell phone to call 
her children.19 Over time, Chao and Ballista’s sexual encounters be-
came more one-sided.20 Ballista would come into Chao’s room two or 
three times a night and force her to perform fellatio against her will.21 
Chao had experienced sexual abuse in the past and, though she began 
to feel used, she was afraid that if she ended the relationship she would 
be put into solitary confinement or transferred to a higher security fa-
cility.22 Chao therefore did not report the abuse, and when officials 
heard rumors from other inmates and asked her about it, she denied 
her relationship with Ballista.23 
 SMCC officials ordered two investigations of sexual activity at 
SMCC, but the investigator found that allegations against Ballista were 
“unsubstantiated.”24 Superintendent Ryan ordered a third and final 
investigation into allegations against Ballista after receiving an anony-
 
13 See Chao v. Ballista (Chao I ), 772 F. Supp. 2d 337, 344–45 (D. Mass. 2011). 
14 Id. at 344. 
15 Chao v. Ballista (Chao II ), 806 F. Supp. 2d 358, 367, 377 (D. Mass. 2011). 
16 Chao I, 772 F. Supp. 2d at 354. 
17 Id. at 356. 
18 Id. at 343. 
19 Id. at 343–44. 
20 Id. at 344. 
21 See Chao I, 772 F. Supp. 2d at 344. 
22 Chao II, 806 F. Supp. 2d at 368–69; Chao I, 772 F. Supp. 2d at 346. 
23 Chao I, 772 F. Supp. 2d at 346. 
24 Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
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mous letter describing Chao and Ballista’s sexual relationship.25 During 
this investigation, Chao finally admitted to the relationship.26 Upon her 
release from prison, Chao brought a § 1983 claim under the Eighth 
Amendment in the district court.27 “It is well established that sexual 
abuse by a prison guard may give rise to an Eighth Amendment claim” 
because sexual abuse is in no way considered a legitimate penological 
goal.28 In part, Chao alleged that Superintendent Ryan violated her 
right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment by failing to pro-
tect her from Ballista’s sexual abuse.29 
 In analyzing Chao’s Eighth Amendment claim and ultimately de-
nying summary judgment, the district court relied on the Supreme 
Court’s standard in Farmer v. Brennan.30 In Farmer, the Court explained 
that in order to prevail on a claim against a prison official under the 
Eighth Amendment, a plaintiff must first demonstrate that the official’s 
alleged conduct is “objectively, ‘sufficiently serious’” so as to constitute 
“‘the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain . . . .’”31 Second, the 
plaintiff must show that the prison official had a “sufficiently culpable 
state of mind” by showing “‘deliberate indifference’ to inmate health or 
safety . . . .”32 The district court therefore analyzed Chao’s claims using 
the two required prongs of the Farmer standard: (1) objectively, suffi-
ciently serious harm; and (2) deliberate indifference—a “more com-
plex” subjective prong that looks into the mind of the official.33 
 The defendants argued that Chao was not abused in a way that 
gave rise to an Eighth Amendment claim because she voluntarily en-
gaged in the sexual relationship with Ballista.34 Courts continue to de-
bate what level of harm resulting from sex in prisons may rise to the 
level of “sufficiently serious,” especially in instances of consensual sex-
                                                                                                                      
25 Id. 
26 Id. 
27 Id. at 341. 
28 Chao II, 806 F. Supp. 2d at 374; see Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833–34 (1994) 
(quoting Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981)) (reasoning that the treatment a 
prisoner receives when incarcerated is subject to scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment 
and that “[b]eing violently assaulted in prison is simply not ‘part of the penalty that crimi-
nal offenders pay for their offenses against society’”). 
29 See Chao I, 772 F. Supp. 2d at 341. 
30 Id. at 347, 353–55; see Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 836–39 (1994). 
31 511 U.S. at 834 (quoting Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 297–98 (1991)). 
32 Id. (quoting Wilson, 501 U.S. at 297, 302–03). 
33 Id.; Chao I, 772 F. Supp. 2d at 347, 353. 
34 Chao I, 772 F. Supp. 2d at 347–48. 
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ual relations.35 The district court nonetheless denied summary judg-
ment and concluded that the seriousness of the harm to Chao was a 
genuine question of material fact for a jury.36 
 It was the second, subjective prong of the Farmer standard—the 
deliberate indifference inquiry—that posed a more difficult question.37 
This prong requires insight into the minds of the defendant officials in 
the particular circumstances of the case to determine whether they had 
a sufficiently culpable state of mind.38 While “[i]t is not necessary that 
the official be aware of the actual harm,” the plaintiff must prove that 
the official was “aware of a substantial risk of harm.”39 The Farmer Court 
explained that “a prison official cannot be found liable under the 
Eighth Amendment for denying an inmate humane conditions of con-
finement unless the official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to 
inmate health or safety . . . .”40 The prison official “must both be aware 
of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk 
of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.”41 
 A prison official’s requisite knowledge of a substantial risk is a 
question of fact.42 While liability cannot be premised on obviousness or 
constructive notice alone, the requisite knowledge can be demon-
strated “in the usual ways, including inference from circumstantial evi-
dence . . . .”43 In applying the Farmer standard, the court considered the 
prison’s physical conditions, the guards’ training, and the prison offi-
                                                                                                                      
35 See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834; Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187, 1196–97 (9th Cir. 
2000) (quoting Felix v. McCarthy, 939 F.2d 699, 702 (9th Cir. 1991)) (reasoning that “no 
lasting physical injury is necessary” for an Eighth Amendment claim; “the only require-
ment is that the officer’s actions be offensive to human dignity,” and “sexual assault on an 
inmate by a guard . . . is deeply offensive to human dignity”) (internal quotations omit-
ted). But see Boddie v. Schnieder, 105 F.3d 857, 861 (2nd Cir. 1997) (reasoning that, al-
though sexual abuse may meet the objective element of a constitutional test under the 
Eighth Amendment, the individual incidents in which the plaintiff was allegedly “verbally 
harassed, touched, and pressed against” were neither “objectively, sufficiently serious” nor 
“cumulatively egregious”) (internal quotations omitted); Freitas v. Ault, 109 F.3d 1335, 
1339 (8th Cir. 1997) (holding that “welcome and voluntary sexual interactions, no matter 
how inappropriate, cannot as a matter of law constitute ‘pain’ as contemplated by the 
Eighth Amendment”); Phillips v. Bird, No. Civ.A. 03-247-KAJ, 2003 WL 22953175, at *6 (D. 
Del. Dec. 1, 2003) (“Consensual sex between two adults does not constitute cruel and un-
usual punishment simply because it occurs within the walls of a prison.”). 
36 Chao I, 772 F. Supp. 2d at 350–52. 
37 See id. at 353–54. 
38 See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834; Wilson, 501 U.S. at 297–99. 
39 Chao I, 772 F. Supp. 2d. at 353; see Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842. 
40 511 U.S. at 837. 
41 Id. 
42 Id. at 842. 
43 See id. at 841–42. 
28 Boston College Journal of Law & Social Justice Vol. 32: E. Supp. 
cials’ response to rumors and allegations.44 The court denied the de-
fendants’ motions for summary judgment and their subsequent post-
trial motions.45 The court explained that a factfinder could come to 
one of two plausible conclusions.46 A jury could determine that the 
prison officials “acted reasonably” and made comprehensive efforts to 
protect inmates.47 A jury could also find, however, “that the defendants 
failed to adequately train their staff and allowed . . . sexual predators to 
run rampant, to coerce sexual favors, [and] to revictimize women who 
were already vulnerable.”48 A jury could therefore find that the defen-
dants “exhibit[ed] precisely the kind of ‘deliberate indifference’ envi-
sioned by the Eighth Amendment.”49 
II. Elements of Harm in Failure to Protect Claims and the 
Application of the Farmer Standard 
 The subjective prong of the Farmer standard, deliberate indiffer-
ence, posed a complex question for the jury in determining that the 
prison officials had a “sufficiently culpable” mindset.50 In cases in which 
the defendant allegedly failed to protect, as in Chao, there may be a 
dearth of testimony about what inferences the defendant actually 
drew.51 In such cases, however, “a genuine issue of material fact as to 
deliberate indifference can be based on a strong showing on the objec-
tive component [of the Farmer standard].”52 The Farmer Court implicitly 
reasoned that the objective and subjective prongs are intertwined.53 
The objective prong, though a separate component, may nonetheless 
inform the subjective, deliberate indifference prong.54 Therefore, the 
objective prison conditions may inform whether a defendant could in-
fer risks of serious harm and was deliberately indifferent.55 
                                                                                                                      
44 Chao I, 772 F. Supp. 2d. at 356. 
45 See Chao II, 806 F. Supp. 2d at 376, 379; Chao I, 772 F. Supp. 2d. at 356, 359. 
46 See Chao I, 772 F. Supp. 2d at 358–59. 
47 Id. at 359. 
48 Id. 
49 Id. 
50 Chao v. Ballista (Chao I ), 772 F. Supp. 2d 337, 353 (D. Mass. 2011); see Farmer v. 
Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). 
51 See Estate of Carter v. City of Detroit, 408 F.3d 305, 307, 313 (6th Cir. 2005) (discuss-
ing a lack of explicit evidence that defendant actually drew inference of harm in deliberate 
indifference claim for failure to provide medical care to detainee). 
52 See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 840–42; Carter, 408 F.3d at 312–13. 
53 See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 840–42; Carter, 408 F.3d at 312–13. 
54 See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 840–42; Carter, 408 F.3d at 312–13. 
55 See Chao I, 772 F. Supp. 2d at 353–54; Carter, 408 F.3d at 313. 
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 Chao alleged that the objective prison conditions of SMCC, such 
as the design of the facility and the heavily-male, minimally-trained 
staff, “created a substantial risk of harm that was known to the defen-
dants . . . .”56 Although the court found that Superintendent Ryan and 
the other officials were attuned to the safety of inmates because they 
were involved in running the prison, discerning actual knowledge in 
the mind of prison officials is a considerable task for the factfinder.57 
The court nonetheless decided that a jury could conclude that the offi-
cials knew about a risk of harm within the prison because it was objec-
tively obvious.58 Both inmates and prison guards knew SMCC to have a 
“highly-charged sexual environment.”59 At least two of the guards, in-
cluding Ballista, were having sexual contact with multiple female in-
mates.60 Inmates “kept the peek” for other inmates engaging in sex 
with guards, and inmates held “story time” to discuss sexual details 
about guards.61 According to Chao, “sex was so common that the horti-
cultural room, which had beds in it and was directly across from the 
staff locker room, was called the ‘Hotel.’”62 
                                                                                                                     
 The obviousness of the sexually-charged environment of SMCC 
may have allowed Superintendent Ryan to infer a risk of harm to in-
mates, but Farmer requires something more than the possibility of an 
inference.63 The subjective prong of the Farmer standard requires that 
the officials actually drew the inference that the particular conditions at 
SMCC, whether obvious or not, posed a significant risk of harm to fe-
male inmates.64 The court recognized that “[i]t is not enough to show 
that they should have known of these conditions but rather, that they ac-
tually did know. That bar is high.”65 Deliberate indifference encapsulates 
a “‘narrow band of conduct,’” in that a prison official can only be 
 
56 Chao I, 772 F. Supp. 2d at 354. 
57 See id. at 353, 355. 
58 Id. at 353–56; see Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842–43; Calderón-Ortiz v. LaBoy-Alvarado, 300 
F.3d 60, 65 (1st Cir. 2002) (finding that prisoner sufficiently pled deliberate indifference 
by alleging prison officers were aware that pre-trial detainees were being housed without 
regard to security needs, and that this was an obviously dangerous practice); Giroux v. 
Somerset County, 178 F.3d 28, 33 (1st Cir. 1999) (finding that inmate was on “cell feed 
status” may have been obvious indicator that inmate was at risk of attack from other in-
mates to implicate police sergeant’s deliberate indifference to inmate’s potential harm). 
59 Chao v. Ballista (Chao II ), 806 F. Supp. 2d 358, 367 (D. Mass. 2011); Chao I, 772 F. 
Supp. 2d at 344–45. 
60 Chao II, 806 F. Supp. 2d at 367. 
61 Id. at 368 (internal quotations omitted); Chao I, 772 F. Supp. 2d. at 345. 
62 Chao I, 772 F. Supp. 2d. at 345. 
63 See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837; Chao I, 772 F. Supp. 2d at 354–55. 
64 See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837; Chao I, 772 F. Supp. 2d. at 355. 
65 Chao I, 772 F. Supp. 2d at 355; see Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. 
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found to be deliberately indifferent if he actually knew about the risk of 
harm.66 
 In applying the Farmer standard, however, the court amplified the 
objective obviousness of these potential harms by discussing the prison 
experience of all-female facilities generally, rather than only relying on 
the specific circumstances at SMCC.67 The court explained that female 
inmates are “particularly vulnerable” because of the prevalence of sex-
ual, mental, and physical abuse they experience before their impris-
onment.68 “Women bring their histories to prison,” and “this abuse has 
lasting consequences for them.”69 For female inmates who have a his-
tory of abuse, sexual abuse by guards may retraumatize them.70  
 The court also emphasized that female inmates commonly have 
male dependency problems.71 This is exacerbated by the “inherently 
imbalanced” relationship between female inmates and male guards be-
cause the guard has “absolute power,” and the female inmate must rely 
on him for even basic necessities.72 Moreover, the court recognized that 
as a result of improper relationships with guards, vulnerable female 
inmates may experience a number of physical symptoms including de-
pression, frequent headaches, irritability, nausea, and insomnia.73 This 
discussion brought thoughtful attention to the unique vulnerabilities of 
female inmates.74 The court nonetheless went beyond the particular 
experience of Chao and the circumstances at SMCC in its discussion 
about the objective obviousness of a risk of harm at SMCC.75 
                                                                                                                      
66 Leavitt v. Corr. Med. Servs., Inc., 645 F.3d 484, 497 (1st Cir. 2011) (quoting Feeney v. 
Corr. Med. Servs., Inc., 464 F.3d 158, 162 (1st Cir. 2006)) (discussing deliberate indiffer-
ence in the context of failure to provide medical treatment); see Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. 
67 Compare Chao I, 772 F. Supp. 2d at 350–52 (discussing female inmates generally), 
with Farmer, 511 U.S. at 829, 834, 848–49 (considering specific qualities of transsexual in-
mate, including inmate’s “‘youth and feminine appearance,’” in combination with objec-
tive safety characteristics of that particular facility), and Taylor v. Michigan Dep’t of Corr., 
69 F.3d 76, 81–83 (6th Cir. 1995) (discussing “a particular class of persons,” such as passive, 
“small, youthful prisoners [who] are especially vulnerable to sexual pressure” within the 
context of that particular facility), and id. at 87 (Wellford, J., dissenting) (reasoning that in 
comparison to “the characteristics of the pre-operative transsexual in Farmer,” even factors 
such as youthful and small are too subjective to hold warden liable). 
68 Chao I, 772 F. Supp. 2d at 351. 
69 Id. 
70 See id. 
71 See id. 
72 See id. at 350–51. 
73 See Chao I, 772 F. Supp. 2d at 351. 
74 See id. at 351, 353–54. 
75 See id. (citing Calderón-Ortiz, 300 F.3d at 65–66) (finding that prison officials can be 
liable for a failure to protect an inmate when it was obvious that the structure or practices 
of the prison created a substantial risk of harm). 
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 Although Farmer implied that objective conditions could inform 
the subjective inquiry of whether a defendant was deliberately indiffer-
ent, Farmer reflected a cautious approach to imposing liability.76 The 
Farmer Court explained that “[t]he Eighth Amendment does not outlaw 
cruel and unusual conditions; it outlaws cruel and unusual punish-
ments.”77 “[A]n official’s failure to alleviate a significant risk that he 
should have perceived but did not . . . cannot . . . be condemned as the 
infliction of punishment.”78 Therefore, courts may require that prison 
officials knew of a “substantial risk of serious harm to a particular class 
of persons . . . .”79 Any circumstantial evidence presented to the jury 
should remain within the bounds of the class of persons similarly situ-
ated to the plaintiff at that particular prison.80 Prison officials cannot 
be held liable for failure to protect inmates when the officials were un-
aware of the risks, lest the court establish a standard approaching strict 
liability.81 The district court in Chao introduced new characteristics of 
the female prison experience from which prison officials could now be 
expected to infer sufficiently serious harm.82 
III. Deliberate Indifference and the Risk of Creating a 
Presumption of Harm in Female Prisons 
 The district court applied a reasoned application of the Farmer 
standard in allowing Chao to go to the jury, but the court’s discussion of 
the vulnerabilities of female inmates was problematic.83 While referring 
                                                                                                                      
76 See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834, 837–38, 840–41; Carter, 408 F.3d at 312–13. 
77 See 511 U.S. at 837 (internal quotations omitted). 
78 Id. at 838. 
79 See Taylor, 69 F.3d at 81. 
80 See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 829, 834, 848–49 (considering specific qualities of transsexual 
inmate in combination with objective safety characteristics of that particular facility in 
determining prison official liability); Taylor, 69 F.3d at 81–83 (determining that liability 
should be imposed only when prison official should have known that inmate was part of an 
identifiable class of persons who risk being singled out for attack, and applying the Farmer 
framework within the context of that particular facility). 
81 See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834, 837–38; Chao I, 772 F. Supp. 2d at 353. 
82 See Chao I, 772 F. Supp. 2d. at 350–52. 
83 See Chao v. Ballista (Chao I ), 772 F. Supp. 2d 337, 350–52, 355, 359 (D. Mass. 2011) 
(finding denial of summary judgment appropriate where plaintiff sets forth specific facts 
to show a genuine issue of fact for trial); see also Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 829, 834, 
848–49 (considering specific qualities of transsexual inmate and objective safety character-
istics of that particular facility); Taylor v. Michigan Dep’t of Corr., 69 F.3d 76, 81–83 (6th 
Cir. 1995) (discussing the need for knowledge of risk to “a particular class of persons” and 
considering the context of that particular facility); id. at 87 (Wellford, J., dissenting) (rea-
soning that in comparison to “the characteristics of the pre-operative transsexual in 
Farmer,” even factors such as youthful and small are too subjective to hold warden liable). 
32 Boston College Journal of Law & Social Justice Vol. 32: E. Supp. 
to its in-depth discussion of the unique vulnerabilities of female in-
mates as a factual “backdrop,” the court implied a presumption of suf-
ficiently serious harm within the walls of SMCC.84 The court’s inclusion 
of outside evidence of female inmates’ susceptibility to harm imputed 
objective harm to all inmates at SMCC.85 This presumption that all fe-
male inmates enter prison primed for constitutional harm effectively 
lowers the bar of objectively sufficiently serious harm, and juries may 
use this to inform the subjective prong of Farmer—what officials actually 
inferred from the objective prison conditions.86 
 Providing the jury in Chao with general information about female 
inmates’ unique vulnerabilities may encourage the conclusion that Su-
perintendent Ryan actually drew the inference of substantial harm to 
Chao.87 While this presumption of objectively sufficiently serious harm 
in all-female prisons does not relieve a plaintiff of her duty to present 
specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial, it could lessen the 
amount of evidence a plaintiff must produce.88 The court found that 
“the jury necessarily found the harm in this case, in these circumstances to 
be sufficiently serious.”89 Yet a presumption of constitutional harm may 
have coaxed the jury to construe evidence in light of the objectively 
sufficiently serious harm that jurors were told female inmates necessar-
ily face as a condition of incarceration.90 
 The finding that Superintendent Ryan failed to protect Chao from 
constitutional harm suggests that the court allowed the jury to step 
away from the limitations of Farmer toward a presumption of pre-
existing harm and the establishment of a strict liability approach.91 
Farmer, however, implicitly rejected a strict liability approach in in-
                                                                                                                      
84 See Chao I, 772 F. Supp. 2d at 351–52. 
85 See Chao v. Ballista (Chao II ), 806 F. Supp. 2d 358, 371–72, 375–76 (D. Mass. 2011); 
Chao I, 772 F. Supp. 2d at 350–52. 
86 See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834, 837; Chao II, 806 F. Supp. 2d at 371–72, 375–76; Chao I, 
772 F. Supp. 2d at 353–54. 
87 See Chao II, 806 F. Supp. 2d at 371–72, 375–76; Chao I, 772 F. Supp. 2d at 350–52. 
While the external factors the court discussed could show objectively sufficiently serious 
harm, as required by the first prong of the Farmer standard, Chao’s allegations were rooted 
in the particular objective conditions at SMCC from which officials could specifically infer 
a substantial risk of serious harm. See Chao I, 772 F. Supp. 2d at 354–55 (“Chao alleges that 
the prison conditions created a substantial risk of harm that was known to the defen-
dants—both in terms of the design of the prison and the training and supervision of the 
officers [at SMCC].”). 
88 See Chao II, 806 F. Supp. 2d at 371–72, 375–76; Chao I, 772 F. Supp. 2d at 350–52. 
89 Chao II, 806 F. Supp. 2d at 375. 
90 See id. at 371–72, 375–76; Chao I, 772 F. Supp. 2d at 350–52. 
91 See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 843; Chao II, 806 F. Supp. 2d at 371–72, 375–76; Chao I, 772 F. 
Supp. 2d at 350–52. 
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stances of prisoner harm.92 The Farmer Court stated that not every in-
jury “translates into constitutional liability for prison officials responsi-
ble for the victim’s safety.”93 The district court’s discussion situated 
broader female inmate vulnerability within the narrative of Chao’s spe-
cific experience at SMCC.94 While courts should perhaps distinguish 
between the experiences of inmates at all-male and all-female prisons 
when determining risks of objective harm, reflexively emphasizing in-
nate female vulnerabilities may lower the threshold for constitutional 
liability.95 
 Ambiguities now exist as to a court’s potential to further broaden 
the Farmer standard.96 In determining potential objective harm, a court 
now seems at liberty to consider a wider range of external evidence.97 
The district court’s consideration of evidence not necessarily specific to 
Chao or other similarly situated female inmates at SMCC expanded the 
Farmer framework and allowed the court to look beyond objective indi-
cators of harm from which officials could reasonably be expected to 
infer substantial risk.98 The district court’s application of the Farmer 
standard may allow prison official liability to be predicated not on the 
presence of objectively sufficiently serious harm and deliberate indif-
ference, but on a weaker foundation of evidence about the vulnerability 
of female inmates in general.99 
Conclusion 
 Repetitive and willful sexual abuse at the hands of a prison guard 
serves no legitimate penological objective. Being repeatedly forced to 
perform sexual acts “is simply not ‘part of the penalty that criminal of-
                                                                                                                      
92 See 511 U.S. at 834. 
93 See id. 
94 See Chao I, 772 F. Supp. 2d at 350–52. 
95 See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837–38; Chao I, 772 F. Supp. 2d. at 350–52. 
96 See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837–38, 841–42; Chao I, 772 F. Supp. 2d. at 351–55. 
97 See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837–38, 841–42; Chao I, 772 F. Supp. 2d. at 350–55. 
98 See Chao I, 772 F. Supp. 2d at 347–52; see also Farmer, 511 U.S. at 829, 834, 848–49 
(considering specific qualities of transsexual inmate, including inmate’s “‘youth and femi-
nine appearance,’” in combination with objective safety characteristics of that particular 
facility); Taylor, 69 F.3d at 81–83 (discussing “a particular class of persons,” such as passive, 
“small, youthful prisoners [who] are especially vulnerable to sexual pressure” within the 
context of that particular facility); id. at 87 (Wellford, J., dissenting) (reasoning that in 
comparison to “the characteristics of the pre-operative transsexual in Farmer,” even factors 
such as youthful and small are too subjective to hold warden liable). 
99 See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 829, 834, 848–49; Taylor, 69 F.3d at 81–83; id. at 87 (Wellford, 
J., dissenting); Chao I, 772 F. Supp. 2d at 350–55. 
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fenders pay for their offenses against society.’”100 The district court ex-
ercised sound judgment in allowing the case to go to a jury and skill-
fully fleshed out the Farmer v. Brennan framework as it has been applied 
in courts since its inception. Drawing attention to the unique safety 
challenges of the all-female prison experience, the court recognized 
the importance of protecting a potentially vulnerable class of persons. 
Nevertheless, the court may have gone too far in its application of 
Farmer by conflating potentially harmful prison conditions specific to 
Chao at SMCC with harms associated with female inmates generally. In 
so doing, the court implied a presumption of constitutional harm in all-
female prisons, effectively placing prison officials working in those fa-
cilities closer to meeting the subjective deliberate indifference thresh-
old under the Farmer standard. If followed by other courts, the district 
court’s reasoning could lower the bar for plaintiffs in establishing 
Eighth Amendment violations by prison officials in all-female facilities. 
 
100 See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994) (quoting Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 
U.S. 337, 347 (1981)). 
